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of many neurons of a particular 
class at a behaviorally relevant 
time frame [29,30]. Some day, 
these kinds of techniques might 
be able to test directly whether 
some of these circuit features 
underlie the capabilities that 
we consider peculiarly human. 
Cognitive capabilities — making 
judgments, formulating plans, 
making decisions — may use 
the same circuit features that 
are used for sensory processing, 
working on the abstracted 
information in the same way 
that sensory areas act upon 
primary sensory input. However, 
the important lessons of how to 
find function from form in neural 
circuits must be remembered 
or these new techniques won’t 
give anything more than pretty 
pictures.
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Paul D. Sniegowski  
and Helen A. Murphy
Increasing numbers of biologists 
are invoking ‘evolvability’ to 
explain the general significance 
of genomic and developmental 
phenomena affecting genetic 
variation. What exactly is 
evolvability, and how important 
is it likely to be for our 
understanding of evolution? 
Definitions of evolvability are 
almost as numerous as the 
papers and books that have 
been written on the subject. All 
definitions agree that evolvability 
has to do with the capacity of 
populations to evolve — no 
surprise there. In actual use, 
however, evolvability can be 
a rather slippery concept 
with a variety of meanings 
and implications. The goals 
of this primer are to try to pin 
down some of the meanings of 
evolvability and to explain why 
evolvability is a controversial 
subject.
Evolvability and heritability
First, it is important to point out 
a basic way in which populations 
can vary in their capacities to 
evolve that is not controversial. 
A population with a large amount 
of heritable variation for fitness 
can certainly be considered 
more evolvable than one with 
very little heritable variation for 
fitness. Similarly, a population 
with a larger amount of heritable 
variation for a phenotypic 
character will respond more 
quickly to natural or artificial 
selection on that character 
than one with a smaller amount 
of such variation. Evolvability 
of this kind is central to our 
established quantitative genetic 
understanding of phenotypic 
evolution.
Evolvability and the generation 
of new variation
Most recent ideas about 
evolvability, however, focus on 
the capacity of populations to 
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Figure 1. The population genetic problem with selection on evolvability. 
A ‘variability allele’ (red circle) gives rise to a new beneficial allele (blue square) in the 
same genomic background. Because of recombination, the variability allele does not 
spread in the population along with the beneficial allele. Furthermore, because deleteri-
ous mutations (black squares) are far more common than beneficial ones, the variability 
allele occupies genomes that are more contaminated than average with deleterious 
mutations, and so it declines to very low frequency in the population.produce new selectable variation, 
rather than on the amount of 
standing variation already present 
in populations. These recent 
ideas emphasise properties 
conferring intrinsic variability over 
static descriptors of variation. 
Implicit in this approach is a 
concern that the evolution of 
populations is limited by the rate 
at which new variation arises or 
by biases in the types of new 
variation that arise.
Researchers motivated 
by this concern argue that 
evolutionary theory has not 
adequately explained why 
populations possess sufficient 
intrinsic variability for long-term 
adaptation and phenotypic 
innovation. Accordingly, some 
have suggested that features 
such as elevated mutation rates, 
unusual mutational mechanisms 
and modular developmental 
programmes play major and 
previously unsuspected roles in 
facilitating evolution. It has even 
been proposed that the functional 
purpose of such features is to 
ensure an appropriate supply 
of variation for evolution: in the 
words of one recent author, that 
life has ‘evolved to evolve’.
The problem of teleology
The idea that variability has been 
fine-tuned in order to maximize 
the evolutionary potential 
of populations is certainly 
controversial, although it is not 
new. The obvious reason to be 
suspicious of this idea is that 
it suggests a teleological view 
of evolution. Natural selection cannot adapt a population for 
future contingencies any more 
than an effect can precede its 
cause, so any future utility of the 
capacity to generate variation 
can have no influence on the 
maintenance of that capacity in 
the present. As Sydney Brenner 
supposedly remarked many years 
ago, it would make no sense for a 
population in an early geological 
period to retain a feature that 
was useless merely because 
it might “come in handy in the 
Cretaceous!”
Evolvability-as-adaptation?
Teleology need not be invoked 
to support evolvability 
arguments, however. A history 
of environmental uncertainty 
could favor a population with 
increased variability over others 
because such a population 
was more successful at 
adapting. One might call this 
the evolvability-as-adaptation 
hypothesis. This hypothesis 
is intuitively appealing, but it 
has its own set of problems. 
For one thing, it assumes that 
variability — the capacity to 
generate new variation — is 
generally limiting to population 
persistence and success in 
nature. This assumption lacks 
empirical support. Most natural 
populations have large amounts 
of standing genetic variation and 
do not necessarily depend on de 
novo variation in order to adapt 
to environmental change. Directly 
observed rates of short-term 
evolution in natural populations 
often far exceed those inferred from the fossil record, and this 
too implies that there is ample 
capacity for adaptation in 
response to selection in most 
populations. In short, there are 
grounds for doubting that the 
selective conditions necessary 
to favor increased variability are 
generally important in nature.
But even when conditions 
might favor increased variability, 
evolvability-as-adaptation 
is problematic. Because 
populations, not individuals, 
evolve and adapt, it follows that 
evolvability-as-adaptation must 
be the consequence of selection 
among populations rather than 
selection among individuals. 
Selection among populations 
is possible, in principle, but it 
is a very weak force compared 
with individual-level selection. 
Individual selection, in turn, is 
likely to oppose genome-wide 
increases in variability: an allele 
that increases the generation 
of new variation will not be 
selectively favored on its own 
merits within a population 
(barring any fortuitous pleiotropic 
effect it may have on individual 
fitness); instead, selection 
will affect its frequency as a 
consequence of its association 
with fitness mutations at other 
gene loci. A ‘variability allele’ 
may well cause more new 
beneficial variants to arise, 
but recombination — a nearly 
ubiquitous feature of living 
populations — will dissociate 
it from these variants and 
keep it from spreading in a 
population (Figure 1). Indeed, 
because most new variation 
affecting fitness is harmful, a 
variability allele will tend to 
occupy genomic backgrounds of 
lower- than- average fitness and 
will therefore be disfavored by 
natural selection. 
Two fundamental population 
genetic factors thus oppose 
increases in variability: 
recombination, and the 
prevalence of deleterious 
mutations over beneficial 
mutations. Where these factors 
are weakened, the evolution of 
increased variability is more likely. 
Experimental and theoretical 
studies, for example, have shown 
that high genomic mutation rates 
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populations, where ‘mutator’ 
alleles defective in genomic 
replication and repair processes 
can hitchhike to high frequency 
with beneficial mutations. It 
remains unclear, though, whether 
mutator hitchhiking represents 
evolvability-as-adaptation 
or is merely a byproduct of 
asexuality; in the long run, an 
elevated genomic mutation rate 
must be harmful because of the 
extra deleterious mutations it 
engenders. 
A more convincing example of 
selection for evolvability is found 
in the so-called ‘contingency loci’ 
of microbial pathogens, where 
the effects of both recombination 
and deleterious mutation are 
mitigated. The immune system of 
a host can generate a relentless, 
dynamically specific, and lethal 
selective regime that favors 
rapid production of antigenic (as 
opposed to functional) novelty in a 
pathogen, and this has the effect of 
increasing the ratio of beneficial to 
deleterious mutations at antigen-
encoding loci. Interestingly, 
unstable sequence features such 
as tandem repeats tend to be 
found disproportionately near and 
within such loci in pathogens, 
where they enhance variability and 
remain linked to new beneficial 
mutations. Contingency loci 
provide our best example  
of evolvability-as-adaptation,  
but their relevance to the  
general question of whether  
evolvability-as-adaptation is a 
major missing component of 
evolutionary theory seems rather 
limited. 
In general, evolvability- 
as-adaptation has the same 
kinds of logical problems that 
G.C. Williams noted decades ago 
when questioning group-level 
selective explanations of animal 
behavior in his book Adaptation 
and Natural Selection (1966). 
Williams’s injunction at the 
time to search for evolutionary 
explanations at no higher a level 
of biological organization than is 
necessary still makes sense, as 
does his memorable observation 
that “adaptation is a special and 
onerous concept that should 
be used only where it is really 
necessary”. Evolvability-as-byproduct?
If selection for evolvability is 
unlikely in most circumstances, 
does this necessarily mean that 
variability differences can have 
no effect on the evolution of 
populations? No: populations can 
differ in variability for reasons 
unrelated to selection on their 
capacities to adapt and evolve, 
and such differences could 
still have incidental effects on 
evolvability. One might call this 
the evolvability-as-byproduct 
hypothesis. 
The distinction between 
the evolvability-as-adaptation 
and evolvability-as-byproduct 
hypotheses is well illustrated 
by contrasting interpretations 
of the biological significance of 
transposable genetic elements. 
Transposable elements are 
ubiquitous and have been 
discovered in almost all  
well-characterised genomes. 
Their replication, insertion, 
and recombinational activities 
produce mutations that can be 
quite different in their effects 
from those produced by simple 
errors in base incorporation 
during genome replication, 
and mutations induced by 
transposable elements contribute 
substantially to the genomic 
spontaneous mutation rate 
in some organisms. Barbara 
McClintock, the discoverer of 
transposable elements, argued 
that their biological purpose 
was to mediate the responses 
of genomes to stress and 
evolutionary challenge: this is 
an example of the evolvability-
as-adaptation hypothesis. A 
more parsimonious alternative 
view — and one that has been 
well supported by studies 
of the population biology of 
transposable elements — is that 
these elements are parasitic DNA 
entities that are maintained, like 
all parasites, by virtue of their 
ability to replicate faster than 
selection can eliminate them from 
the host population. Populations 
with and without these elements 
might differ in their evolvability 
because of the distinct types 
of mutation they cause 
(evolvability-as-byproduct), but 
evolvability-as-adaptation need 
not be invoked to explain why populations harbour transposable 
elements.
There are many features of 
populations that may have 
incidental effects on evolvability. 
For example, it has been 
proposed that modularity in 
gene regulatory networks may 
have contributed evolutionary 
flexibility to development and 
facilitated the diversification 
of animal body plans. This 
idea was inspired in part by 
the previous observations 
of computer scientists that 
modularly structured evolutionary 
algorithm programs are more 
evolvable than nonmodular ones. 
Although the coding structures 
of evolutionary algorithms can 
be manipulated by programmers 
to ensure evolvability, genetic 
control over development 
is more likely to have been 
shaped and constrained by 
individual fitness effects than 
by its long-term consequences 
for taxonomic and adaptive 
divergence. Nonetheless, it is 
a reasonable hypothesis that 
modularity of developmental 
control has had important side 
consequences for the variability 
of animal populations. In another 
example, it has recently been 
proposed that prion activity 
in yeast, which can allow 
translational read-through of 
stop codons and hence the 
expression of novel variation, 
may enhance evolvability. Again, 
it is questionable whether prion 
activity represents evolvability-
as-adaptation for the kinds 
of reasons discussed above, 
but it is plausible that prion 
activity has incidental effects on 
evolvability.
The problem of testability
In fact, it is rather easy to pile 
up examples of genomic and 
developmental features that may 
affect evolvability, and this is a 
bit troubling: How do we know 
when it is necessary — rather 
than just appealing — to invoke 
evolvability differences in 
order to explain evolutionary 
histories? The problem here is 
that the evolvability-as-byproduct 
hypothesis is probably correct 
in a very broad sense that tells 
us little we did not already know: 
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Neural basis of 
time changes 
during saccades
Michael R. Ibbotson,  
Nathan A. Crowder, and  
Nicholas S.C. Price
Normal vision consists of 
periods of fixation (around 
300 ms) interspersed with 
rapid eye movements called 
saccades. Saccades create 
special problems for the visual 
system, such as rapid, whole 
field motion across the retina 
and changes in the relationship 
between object positions in 
space and image positions on 
the retina [1]. Changes to visual 
processing occur around the 
time of saccades to cope with 
these problems. Two time- related 
phenomena resulting from 
this altered processing are 
perceptual time compression 
during a saccade and slight 
post-saccadic time expansion 
[2]. We show that neurons in 
visual areas of primate parietal 
cortex have reduced latencies to 
visual stimulation at the time of 
a saccade [3,4]. This observation 
provides a neural explanation 
for the time related perceptual 
changes.
Morrone et al. [2] 
demonstrated time compression 
of visually presented stimuli 
(but not of audible clicks) during 
saccades. They presented 
successive flashed visual stimuli 
to people and found that the 
inter-stimulus interval was 
underestimated if the flashes 
were presented slightly before 
or during a saccade. Observers 
underestimated a 110 ms interval 
by up to 60 ms. Interestingly, the 
precision of time estimations 
was increased during saccades, 
and for critical time intervals 
there was an inversion of time. 
The inversion was observed by 
asking subjects to report the 
temporal order of the flashed 
bars: observers consistently 
reported the second flash as because newly arising variation 
modifies existing organismal 
blueprints, large differences 
between taxa imply differences 
in the kinds and amounts of new 
variation that can arise. The new 
variation immediately available 
to a metazoan population, for 
example, is obviously different 
from that immediately available 
to a single- celled eukaryote 
population. It follows that the 
evolvabilities of metazoans and 
single-celled eukaryotes are 
probably different at present, at 
least in the short term. It would 
be far more interesting, though, 
to know whether differences in 
evolvability explain in the first 
place why some single-celled 
lineages became metazoans 
whereas others remained 
single- celled, and this is a much 
more difficult problem. 
Invoking variability as a 
retrospective explanation for 
why one clade has diversified or 
changed more than another does 
not rule out the possibility that 
the clades evolved differently for 
reasons unrelated to variability. 
And finding isolated examples 
of evolutionary novelties 
related to distinctive variability 
mechanisms — for example, 
mutations of major phenotypic 
effect caused by transposable 
elements — provides only 
anecdotal evidence for the 
importance of such variability 
mechanisms in evolution. As other 
commentators on evolvability 
have noted, there is a need for 
quantitative, testable predictions 
concerning evolvability rather 
than retrospective and anecdotal 
arguments. Approaches such 
as computer simulation and 
long-term experimental evolution 
may yield some progress in 
this direction because they 
allow direct manipulation and 
assessment of the effects 
of variability differences on 
evolution, but even these kinds 
of approaches may not provide 
dependable insights into whether 
and how variability differences 
have actually affected the 
evolution of natural populations. 
Conclusion
Our knowledge of molecular 
mechanisms that affect the origin of variation in populations 
has grown very rapidly in 
recent decades; in contrast, 
our fundamental genetic 
understanding of natural 
selection developed before 1950 
and has not changed in major 
ways since then. To some, this 
historical disjunction suggests 
that evolutionary theory cannot 
account for the origin and 
maintenance of mechanisms 
affecting variability and is 
overdue for major revision. It is 
indeed attractive to suppose that 
the most important evolutionary 
feature of organisms — their 
very capacity to evolve and 
adapt — is itself an adaptation, 
but this is probably only true in 
highly restricted circumstances. 
Instead, variability is probably 
most often a byproduct of the 
messy and intricate ways in 
which genomes have evolved. 
And the possibility that incidental 
differences in variability between 
populations have caused 
differences in evolvability with 
profound consequences for 
evolutionary history remains 
an interesting — but largely 
untested — hypothesis.
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